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Abstract In a recent article in Sociology, Mouzelis argues that Lockwood’s 
distinction between system integration and social integration is, with some modifications, 
still to be retained because of its logical coherence and its methodological 
virtues. While its basic value is recognised, this article reconsiders the distinction in 
the light of some recent achievements in social theory. It is argued that the 
distinction does not merely offer two different perspectives on society but that, in 
the actual social world, both dimensions are intertwined in a number of ways. In 
particular, reflexive actors can draw the distinction themselves which raises 
questions about the objective status of ‘incompatibilities’. The implications are 
developed through some reflections on the nature of social processes as well as the 
role of institutions, strategic action and conflicts. On the one hand, it is shown that 
system integration is an important objective for social agency, since many actions 
are aimed at controlling the performance of processes. On the other, social 
integration has a decisive impact on those processes because conflict and cooperation 
transform the institutional preconditions those processes are based upon. 
The social–system integration distinction offers therefore interesting insights into 
how social actors themselves attempt to cope with their worlds. Apart from being a 
methodological tool, the distinction expresses a substantial characteristic of society. 
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In a recent article in Sociology, Nicos Mouzelis (1997) presents a brief 
genealogy of the classical distinction between system integration and social 
integration.1 Following Lockwood’s seminal article in 1964, other prominent 
sociologists such as Habermas and Giddens attempted to offer a tool for 
conceptualising the eternal dichotomy of structure and agency in sociological 
theory. For Mouzelis, Lockwood’s understanding is, with some modification, 
still the most coherent approach. It offers ‘logical congruence’ because ‘social 
integration’ unequivocally refers to the ‘co-operative/conflictual relationships 
between actors’ whereas ‘system integration’ describes the ‘compatibilities/ 
incompatibilities between ‘‘parts’’ that are always viewed as institutionalised 
complexes portraying different degrees of durability/malleability’ (Mouzelis 
1997:113–14). This allows for a Lockwoodian ‘perspectivism’, i.e. the possibility 
of perceiving ‘the same social phenomena from two different perspectives’ 
(1997:114). Habermas’s (1987) distinction, for Mouzelis, is logically 
incongruent with his mechanism of co-ordination because system integration 
(externalist perspective) is associated with economic and political ‘systems’ 
whereas social integration (internalist perspective) is exclusively concerned 
with the ‘lifeworld’ (Mouzelis 1997:114–16). Consequently, economies and 
politics cannot be conceptualised from a viewpoint of social integration 
whereas other spheres of society cannot be dealt with from a system 
integration perspective. For Giddens (1986:139–44), in his attempt to 
overcome the structure/agency dualism, social integration refers to circumstances 
of co-presence, and system integration refers to interaction stretched 
over time-space. Mouzelis objects that this disregards the fact that certain 
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micro-interactions may well entail consequences extended over time and space 
(1997:116–17). Giddens, according to Mouzelis, is also forced to re-introduce 
the subjectivist–objectivist divide by the backdoor in the guise of his 
distinction between ‘institutional analysis’ and ‘strategic-conduct analysis’ 
which corresponds, more or less, to Lockwood’s original distinction (Mouzelis 
1997:117). 
Whereas I agree with Mouzelis’s criticisms directed against Habermas and 
Giddens, I would argue that even a reformulated version of Lockwood’s 
notion is still not satisfactory. Therefore, as a footnote, as it were, to this 
‘latent’ debate, I would like to suggest an alternative view. Epistemologically, 
an antifoundationalist perspective is adopted, i.e. no substantial assumptions 
are made about how society is structured. Instead, attention is paid to how 
‘systems’ are actually constructed and reproduced by actors themselves 
without ever denying the existence of such systems. Thus, whereas the 
distinction between the ‘systemic’ and the ‘interactive’ aspects of society 
should definitely be retained, theorising the link between them needs to be 
more developed. 
In a first step – after a brief theoretical contextualisation of the debate – I 
investigate the nature of systemic incompatibilities as implied in the system/ 
social integration distinction. The notion of ‘processes’ is introduced for 
conceptualising the ‘systemic’ dimension of society because it offers a better 
understanding of how the latter is linked to the ‘social’ dimension. In a second 
step, it is argued that social processes (and, therefore, incompatibilities) are 
not ‘objective’ but that they are linked to specific ‘sites of agency’. However, 
actors themselves can conceptualise social reality as a set of objective processes 
(i.e. in terms of system integration) and employ the latter within their activities. 
Thirdly, this is specified by looking at the role of institutions and the 
‘production of effects’ through institutional modification. Finally, I show how 
system and social integration are inter-linked and entangled in the social 
world. It is argued that system integration is an important objective for social 
agency, and, in turn, social integration has a decisive impact on the coherence 
of social processes. 
A Brief Theoretical Contextualisation 
A few comments on the theoretical context of this debate precede the detailed 
work. The discussion on the ‘artificial’ dichotomy (Lockwood) between social 
and system integration has to be located within the context of more general 
problems in social theory. Two traditional issues are of particular relevance 
here, the problem of social order and disorder, on the one hand, and the 
problem of structure and agency, on the other. The former is not just 
concerned with the question of how social order is constituted but, perhaps 
more importantly, of how social order is understood. For instance, the 
Durkheimian tradition puts the emphasis on a common framework of shared 
norms and values as the basis for social order (Lockwood 1992). To the 
contrary, in classical Marxist theorizing, the integration of capitalist societies 
is thought to be based on a ‘matching’ articulation between productive forces 
and the relations of production (Lockwood 1992). In the former case, ‘social 
integration’ is stressed whereas in the latter, ‘system integration’ is held 
responsible for social order. The precise relationship between social and 
system integration is already implicit in the specific meta-perspectives on 
society adopted. Lockwood’s early call for an analytical integration of social 
and system integration was therefore nothing less than the defence of a certain 
model of society where both the interactive and systemic aspects of social 
order would be taken into consideration:2 ‘The problem of social integration 
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. . . cannot be fully understood without taking account of the ways in which 
changes in both the normative and realistic conditions of action are usually the 
unintended consequences, or system effects, of the interrelations of a society’s 
economic, political, and religious subsystems’ (Lockwood 1992:377–8; 
emphasis added). Although one can agree with Lockwood’s general line, a 
certain ambiguity remains in two aspects. First, how real are those ‘realistic’ 
conditions of action, and, secondly, what is the social ontology behind those 
presupposed ‘subsystems’? In other words, how are functional processes in 
societies to be understood? Before dealing in more detail with these issues, a 
few remarks on a second ‘grand theme’ of social theory must be made. 
The structure–agency problem is concerned with the paradoxical relationship 
between the structural determination and the transformative potential of 
agency. Although the structure–agency issue has certainly to do with the 
social–system integration distinction, they are not identical. Whereas the 
paradoxical relationship between structure and agency is at the root of a 
theoretical problem, the distinction between social and system integration is 
rather a theoretical tool. Consider, for instance, that a ‘structuralist’ solution 
to the structure–agency issue can be combined either with a view focusing 
mainly on social integration (normative functionalism), or, alternatively, on 
system integration (structuralist Marxism). Thus, a rash identification of 
social integration with agency, and system integration with structure is inappropriate. 
As can be inferred from Lockwood’s original contribution, 
agency can affect system integration,3 and structural patterns can be 
conducive or obstructive to social integration. 
Whereas Lockwood emphasises the need to take into consideration both 
social and system integrative mechanisms for the analysis of social order, a 
number of recent contributions to the structure–agency debate have pointed 
to both the recursive nature of social structure, and the reflexive capacities of 
agency. From such a perspective, a ‘re-entry’ of structure into agency can 
occur, i.e. the situation where conditions of systemic reproduction are 
reflexively and cognitively appropriated by actors and employed in their 
actions.4 I focus in particular on this latter aspect during the following discussion 
of the social–system integration distinction. 
Giddens (1986, 1994), in his theory of structuration, holds that structural 
moments are both moments and the result of social practices (duality of 
structure). In particular, actors are assumed to be knowledgeable subjects and 
capable of reflexively shaping the conditions of system reproduction. As 
Giddens points out, in organisations particularly the reflexive guidance of the 
conditions of systemic reproduction is essential. 
Jessop (1996), from a strategic-relational perspective, ‘relativises’ the 
absolute opposition of ‘external constraints’ and ‘free-willed actions’ and 
turns it into the more dialectical opposition of ‘strategically inscribed strategic 
selectivity’ and ‘strategically calculated oriented action’. In this view, structural 
constraints ‘do not exist outside of specific spatial and temporal horizons 
of action pursued by specific actors’ (1996:126). In turn, agents, as learning 
‘strategically calculating subjects’, are capable of modifying structural 
contexts. In the words of Jessop, such an approach ‘does not posit abstract, 
atemporal and unlocated structures or wholly routinised activities performed 
by ‘‘cultural dupes’’’ (1996:126). 
Inspired by Mouzelis’s and Lockwood’s arguments on systemic incompatibilities, 
in the following I aim to reconsider ‘structural constraints’ by taking 
into account ideas of recursive, reflexive and cognitively grounded action. The 
more (Jessop) or less (Giddens) radical relativisation of ‘structure’ obviously 
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has consequences for the very status of incompatibilities or contradictions. 
The question is where the ‘objectivity’ of structure has ended up. Could it be 
that the constitution of structural constants and the subsequent instantiation 
of constraints can be linked even closer to the transformative and strategically 
calculating capacities of (in particular: collective) action? Bearing in mind 
specifically the strategic-relational reflections, this hypothesis is examined in 
the next section. 
System Integration Reconsidered 
For Mouzelis, system integration refers to compatibilities/incompatibilities 
between institutionalised complexes with different degrees of malleability 
(1997:113–14). What do incompatibilities exactly consist of? And also, from 
what perspective are those complexes incompatible? In Mouzelis’s account it 
seems that systemic contradictions occur merely because the more stable 
institutions affect the more malleable ones. This might be correct but it is too 
abstract to understand exactly how this works. The notion of system integration 
here seems to invoke the functionalist argument of, in some way, 
‘objective’ contradictions. This is why it is crucial to elaborate on the link 
between ‘structure’ and ‘agency’. 
In this regard, and this is in line with Mouzelis’s position, two requirements 
have to be fulfilled. On the one hand, voluntarism must be avoided, i.e. it 
cannot be assumed that any actors have full control over any ‘system’. This 
does, however, not mean that strategic analysis should not remain possible. On 
the other, the a priori ontological assumption that society consists of a series of 
‘systems’, ‘structures’ or ‘infrastructures’ has to be rejected without, however, 
dismissing functional analysis (Mouzelis 1995). Allowing for both strategic and 
functional analysis implies that ‘perspectivism’ (the option to look at the social 
world from, at least, two perspectives) is to be maintained. This is crucial 
because perspectivism mirrors the fundamental dialectic condition of the 
social world: on the one hand, society can be regarded as an object (i.e. as 
‘system’) but, on the other, this apparent object is, at the same time, ‘subject’ 
to transformative practices. Society is necessary and contingent at the same 
time, depending on the standpoint one adopts. Those two perspectives can be 
called ‘externalist’ and ‘internalist’ (Mouzelis 1995).5 However, the two perspectives 
do not merely exist for the external observer (the social scientist) but 
for social actors as well. The methodological distinction therefore re-appears as 
a substantial feature within the object of investigation and is an important 
cognitive resource actors draw upon. This statement will be made more 
explicit below. 
With regard to the nature of systemic incompatibilities, two observations 
are of particular relevance: first, almost trivially, systemic incompatibilities can 
only occur if they are perceived as such at least by some actors. Secondly, 
incompatibilities can only be specified when related to specific social processes 
occurring over time. Starting with the latter, in the following I will attempt to 
specify the implications of these two points for a reworked distinction of 
system integration and social integration. 
A ‘systemic incompatibility’ can be defined as a dysfunctional interaction 
between parts of ‘systems’ or between ‘systems’. Thus, incompatibilities are a 
‘failure’ of a system to perform ‘properly’.6 As such, they can only occur over 
time. There are no ‘synchronic’ incompatibilities, but they become virulent 
only when followed over time. Thus, incompatibilities are a characteristic of 
processes through time. A process can be defined as an ordered sequence of 
events over time.7 Rather than being viewed as ‘systems’, processes are better 
understood as a variety of ‘programmes of action’ if one wants to adopt the 
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heuristic offered by actor network theory (Law 1991). In this view, society can 
be seen as consisting of a multiplicity of overlapping and entangled processes 
on all levels and within different realms. Processes comprise such different 
examples as the 7 per cent growth per annum of the Hong-Kong economy, 
the performance of the market for refrigerators, an environmental boycott 
against a multinational or even ‘global warming’.8 Their crucial characteristic 
is that they are ‘mastered’ (though not dominated) by some specific actors 
(government, government agencies, management), requiring, at the same 
time, the ‘enlisting’ of a variety of less concerned actors (consumers, workers, 
environmentalists). 
To keep processes in motion, their permanent maintenance through a 
myriad of social actions is required. Those latter are ‘ordered’ according to a 
variety of institutional patterns: social structure.9 ‘Social order’ would prove to 
be rather ‘psychotic’ if there were no institutions. Thus, the existence of 
processes relies on many dispersed institutional regularities occurring at any 
moment in time. In other words, diachronic processes are based upon synchronic 
institutional regularities. Those latter constitute ‘social structure’ 
which is – due to its inertia – beyond the immediate reach of actions 
attempting their modification or abolition. Consequently, no process can be 
controlled by any actors. But, because of its incidence on the performance of 
processes over time, institutional modification is one crucial option for 
shaping a process. In this way, the future is changed by changing the present 
(since a direct shaping of the future proves logically impossible). Though 
social actors are precisely concerned with securing themselves a relatively 
coherent future, the only thing they can do is to intervene into ‘present’ social 
structure. This requires a certain anticipation of the potential effects of such 
interventions on the envisaged processes. 
This leads over to the first point on agency mentioned above. If processes 
are sequences of events, they can be cognitively appropriated or even shaped 
by social actors. Processes, whether it is economic growth, profit maximisation, 
the performance of a non-governmental organisation or an individual 
career, do not exist outside of some site of agency. In other words, from an 
antifoundationalist standpoint, no ‘systems’ such as economics, politics or law 
exist. Processes are always under the particular attention of somebody, be it the 
majority of social actors or just one individual. Thus, different processes are of 
different relevance for different actors (whether they support them or contest 
them). 
It follows from these considerations that systemic incompatibilities can be 
seen as malfunctions within processes as they are perceived by concerned 
actors.10 This presupposes that the ‘proper’ performance over time must be 
at least in part anticipated; otherwise unforeseen events would be no surprise 
and one could not speak of malfunctions. Therefore, one can find the criteria 
for incompatibilities within the cognitive conceptualisations of those 
processes retained by the actors themselves. Consequently, no ‘objective’ 
criteria for incompatibilities have to be established since they are delivered by 
the actors themselves! From the viewpoint of such a more radical 
perspectivism, or ‘relationism’ (Latour 1993), systemic contradictions are coconstituted 
with a site of agency. Though they are not objective in a strict 
sense but they are objectified by, and for, the relevant actors. Since the 
existence of processes cannot be presupposed, it is crucial to look at how they 
come into existence and how they are sustained over time. This must, 
however, not imply an ‘overly postmodernist’ position, i.e. denying their 
existence at all. Here the metatheoretical programme of ‘New French social 
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science’, such as the ‘sociology of dispute’ and ‘convention theory’ (Wagner 
1994, Boltanski and Thévenot 1991, Orléan 1994) offers a useful heuristic 
for such thinking. 
What are the consequences for the notion of ‘objectivity’? Necessarily, 
reducing the complexity of the social world involves a selective cognitive 
appropriation of reality.11 This does not, however, imply that it is an arbitrary 
exercise. Actors face a ‘resistance of the object’ (Malpas and Wickham 1995: 
46) when trying to realise their intentions, visions and projects based upon a 
certain ‘image’ of reality. Contradictions are ‘objective’ only in so far as they 
appear as an emergent property within single or interacting processes. But at 
the same time they are also ‘subjective’, since their perception depends on 
how the complexity of the social world was reduced to a relatively coherent 
social reality. 
This is not to say that such an ‘objectivity’ cannot be highly generalised and 
commonly accepted. In such a ‘hegemonic’ situation a certain interpretation 
of social reality is shared by a majority of individual and collective actors. 
Consider a ‘classical’ big-scale process, a ‘Fordist’ economy where steady 
growth rates were achieved through an articulation of a multiplicity of institutional 
regularities. Centralised wage negotiations, central bank policies, 
macro-economic policies but also certain norms of consumption led to the 
emergence of a certain process through time: a relatively steady growth rate 
with low unemployment. In the late 1960s and 1970s, however, a series of 
‘contradictions’ emerged, such as rising unemployment, high inflation and 
decreasing profit rates. Apparently, the existing institutional regularities did 
not sustain the Fordist accumulation process as they had done before. But are 
the contradictions really as objective as they appear? In the following, I would 
like to show that such incompatibilities have more to do with social agency 
than it appears in the first moment. 
Incompatibilities for Whom? 
Consider again the example of Fordism where a model of how economies 
‘should’ work was generalised over a majority of important social actors, 
including governments, business and trade unions. For different reasons, a 
high unemployment rate would have been seen as a serious ‘incompatibility’ 
by most actors. Over time, however, the process evolved in a way that the 
trade-off between low unemployment and other objectives such as ‘adequate’ 
profit rates, inflation rates and public expenditure levels increased steadily. 
Thus, when unemployment began to rise this was, for certain actors, not 
necessarily an ‘incompatibility’ any more since – due to their interests and/or 
persuasion – they were more concerned with labour costs, inflation and state 
deficits. Thus, system integration turns out to be a question of perspective. It 
has to do with how a process is supposed to function from the viewpoint of 
specific social actors, and, thus, with a selective appropriation of reality. One 
could argue that there is a systemic contradiction between the patterns of 
income distribution in ‘post-Fordist’ societies and the prospect of long-term 
economic growth (cf. Lipietz 1996). Since the relative purchasing power of a 
widening part of even the working population is declining, internal macroeconomic 
demand is weak and public sector budgets tend to rise. But one 
must add that this ‘contradiction’ is only problematic from the viewpoint of a 
certain (however defensible!) social project focusing on steady economic 
growth, equal income distribution and a just distribution of working hours. 
For the actors organised on the top of the ‘hour glass’ (Lipietz) this is not 
particularly an issue – given their increased gains from such a new state– 
society–economy formation. At least this holds as long as no other adverse 
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effects arise, such as decreasing social cohesion (crime), which are seen as 
important enough to be countered. 
Thus, sites of agency are intrinsically linked with their ‘own’ objectivity 
from which systemic incompatibilities are perceived. As Mouzelis points out, 
they are, in a sense, indeed ‘normative’. However, systemic (in)compatibilities 
do not only owe their existence to the normative dimension underpinning 
institutional regularities, but their perception itself is a consequence of a 
particular ‘normativity’. Thus, there are many objectivities (and normativities 
linked to them) across social reality. 
To come back to the notion of processes and social structure, this means 
that specific processes exist only for certain actors. The ‘economy’ is very 
different for the coalition between the Chancellor and the Bank of England 
and an unemployed person suffering from a monetarist low inflation policy. 
Each of them also have their own strategies and methods of how to cope with 
the process they are dealing with: ‘running’ the economy and looking for a 
job. Here a useful readjustment of the internalist–externalist distinction can be 
adopted. The internalist perspective is not just a social scientist’s viewpoint but 
exists for every social actor. From this standpoint, actors see themselves as 
autonomous social subjects equipped with a transformative capacity instantiated 
by their normative orientations. In order to realise their projects and 
visions, they have to form coalitions, to mobilise support, to shape identities 
and they might sometimes provoke protest. Thus, to be capable of dealing 
with these normative and interest-led issues, is an important matter for actors 
attempting to achieve social change. In this sense, the production of ‘social 
integration’ is not something which is automatically achieved (as part of the 
‘social order’) but is dealt with actively and consciously by actors themselves. 
If the Bank of England wants to raise interest rates, this is not only a question 
of efficacy (for containing inflation) but also of a certain social acceptance. 
The same applies to the externalist perspective. Not only social scientists, 
but also social actors are capable of perceiving systemic incompatibilities. To 
what extent and on which level this ‘re-entry’ takes place, depends on the 
actor’s positioning within the institutional structure of society. For government, 
malfunctions in the economy can be substantially different from malfunctions 
perceived from the viewpoint of the profit maximisation strategies of 
firms or individuals seeking (quality of) work. Another example is the 
illustration of Weber’s work on ‘patrimonialism’ in Lockwood’s original article 
(1964). According to Lockwood, in patrimonial bureaucratic societies, 
taxation is ‘the strategic functional problem’ for the state bureaucracy (1964: 
253–4). For state authorities, taxation is at their discretion (internalist 
viewpoint), but too high a level of taxes will unavoidably lead to adverse 
effects on tax revenue and governability (externalist viewpoint) as other 
interest groups will contest the measures delivered. In turn, these other 
groups will be subject to analogous limitations. 
In sum, the internalist–externalist distinction (or, in the words of Archer 
1996, ‘analytical dualism’) is doubled over and over in society. Due to this 
‘stroboscope effect’,12 any systemic (in)compatibility on one level is, at the 
same time, generated by agency on another level. Equally, any agency results 
in systemic effects on other levels. It is crucial that this does not just occur to 
social science but to any actor in society in the same way. 
Institutions 
These ideas can be adopted for a closer view on the nature of institutions. 
Two perspectives can be identified. On the one hand, institutions can be seen 
as sets of rules, forming a ‘virtual order’ (Giddens 1986:17) or the ‘paradigmatic 
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dimension’ (Mouzelis 1995:76) of society. On the other, institutions 
are observable regularities, sets of practices extended in time and space 
(Giddens 1986:17), or specific ‘syntagmatic’ configurations (Mouzelis 1995: 
77). The first notion is ‘internalist’, because the adherence to rules and norms 
rests with the normative orientation of the actors. The second is ‘externalist’ 
because the behavioural regularities constituted by institutions are on the basis 
of ‘objective’ social processes, i.e. they affect systemic compatibilities and 
incompatibilities. 
From the internalist perspective, what an institution is depends on its 
signification and its embedding into the value system of actors. In this sense, 
they also serve as criteria for action and non-action. This implies that they 
differ from actor to actor. As such, they are an important factor in the 
constitution of identities. From the externalist standpoint, institutions are 
certain patterns of synchronic ‘social structure’ and as such they constitute 
processes through time. Independently from whether they are acknowledged 
or not, institutions always have effects because they constitute certain patterns 
in the form of ‘statistically relevant’ movements (Demirovic 1992:151). The 
important point is that these regularities show a ‘diffuse efficacy’, i.e. they can 
be constitutive for a potentially infinite number of processes and they exist 
independently from them. Such an assumption is indispensable, because any 
attempt to make a causal link from those institutional effects back to specific 
processes would inevitably result in functionalism. 
However, as mentioned earlier, the externalist standpoint can be adopted 
also by social actors. This means, that institutional regularities can be ‘instrumentalised’ 
by social agency since institutional modification is the most 
important means for the production of effects. Actors modify institutions for 
achieving effects on ‘their’ processes.13 Only in a completely ‘unreflexive’ 
society would such effects be completely ignored by the social actors themselves. 
In fact, one of the most important requirements for social action is 
knowing about institutional regularities and employing them within projects 
and strategies. Institutions make social life intelligible for social actors 
(including social scientists). 
Because, from the internalist viewpoint, institutions are linked to the 
identity of actors, institutional modifications can often be disruptive for the 
affected individuals or groups. Since this might have negative effects on the 
process pursued by the modifying actors (because anticipated regularities 
might be changed) this may even be (cynically or philanthropically) taken into 
account. If this does not work, a conflict is likely. In the light of the arguments 
presented earlier, conflicts can be interpreted as a contestation of institutional 
regularities. From the internalist perspective, this might appear as a defence of 
identities whereas, from the externalist perspective, incurred institutional 
modifications are crucial for the performance of processes, and therefore, 
indirectly, for the future positioning of actors. Most often, social actors are 
certainly aware of this more ‘functional’ or instrumental aspect. In many 
cases, arguments used in social conflicts invoke a ‘logic of efficiency’ (vs. a 
‘logic of equality’) which is exactly adopting an externalist viewpoint on the 
part of social actors.14 Co-operation, by contrast, means readjusting institutional 
regularities through negotiation, concerted action and co-ordination to 
achieve certain effects on processes thought to be beneficial for the 
participants. 
The capacity for institutional modification is unevenly distributed among 
actors and also varies according to the specific objectives pursued, due to the 
strategic selectivity of institutions (cf. Jessop 1990). Specific sets of institutions, 
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actors and projects are configured within ‘centres of power’ (Scherrer 
1995:478) providing privileged positions for reconfiguring synchronic structure. 
Hence, these centres of power allow for the production of effects through 
large-scale institutional re-articulations. Marginal variations can have major 
effects ‘at a distance’ in time and space and across organisational boundaries, 
because their normalising function lies at the root of the constitution of 
processes. A modification of labour legislation can have major consequences 
for the ‘competitiveness’ of a country. Essentially, institutions allow for the 
amplification of social agency. Due to these effects on processes, institutional 
modifications always involve a repositioning of actors not just momentarily 
but over time. Changing large-scale regularities of action requires, in most 
(non-coercive) cases, a discursive mobilisation and is likely to involve the 
transformation of individual and collective identities. Vice versa, the proliferation 
of narratives possibly affects the efficacy of institutions for specific 
processes and can therefore result in material consequences for the complex 
variety of processes monitored by different actors. However, no institutional 
modification can be fully ‘controlled’ by any actor. Monetary policy authorities 
can change the interest rate but cannot directly influence the employment 
policies of firms; the unemployed person cannot influence the interest rate but 
can accept a lower wage or different work. Although there are different degrees 
to which actors can instrumentalise institutions for their own strategies and 
projects, they rely in part on the outcome of path-dependent evolution. This is 
where knowledge and social technology come in, since actors may take certain 
‘evolutionary’ patterns into account and trust in ‘meta-governance’ (Jessop 
1995). The selective attention of actors leads to a duality of strategy and 
evolution. 
Entangling System and Social Integration 
The dichotomy between conflict/co-operation and compatibilities/incompatibilities 
is less clear-cut if one assumes reflexive and knowledgeable actors. For 
instance, conflicts between actors arise, in part, from their perception of 
incompatibilities. This happens when business contests high wages because of 
the supposedly negative effects on individual firm’s competitiveness. Often, 
conflicts are fought in the name of such ‘objective’ functional requirements. 
Similarly, coalitions among actors can be formed because each of them 
regards them as beneficial for the processes they are engaged with: a ‘peaceful’ 
corporate climate reduces the hours lost due to strikes and can therefore 
compensate for higher wages. Thus, co-operation is both beneficial for the 
processes of profit-maximising and negotiating higher wages or minimum 
wages for workers. This presupposes that actors are knowledgeable and 
reflexive about these different processes and are able to shift between 
internalist and externalist viewpoints. The distinction, therefore, repeatedly 
re-appears within society (stroboscope effect). Through cognitive modelling, 
reflexive monitoring and learning, actors are able to draw the process–project 
distinction themselves. They themselves select which process they regard as 
hard to influence, and which they consider to be open for strategic shaping. In 
this sense, actors engage in the ‘art of complexity’ (Jessop 1997), consisting 
both, on the one hand, in the art of drawing up viable projects and 
appropriate implementation techniques (‘social technology’) and, on the 
other, in the art of obtaining support and gaining legitimacy (‘politics’ in a 
wider sense). As a consequence, there is an epistemological isomorphism 
between the social scientist’s account and the actor’s intelligence since they 
rely on knowledge and techniques for their transforming practices. Mouzelis 
acknowledges the importance of the cognitive dimension when he distinguishes 
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between first- and second-order discourses. What he locates in the 
second-order discourse, i.e. the ‘attempts by specialists to understand, 
criticise, legitimate, defend . . . institutions’ (1997:n.3), is exactly how all 
actors try to understand and operationalise the social processes they are 
concerned with. Mouzelis is right in pointing out that some of the ‘discourse 
practices’ are more malleable than others but it must be added that the 
distinction between first and second order discourses is not necessarily a 
hierarchical one. The ‘lay’ first-order discourses may in fact contain ‘reconceptualisations’ 
of the ‘expert’ second-order discourses instantiated in the 
‘management’ of processes, such as the monetary policy of the central bank. 
Consequently, discourses of much more than two orders exist together with 
the entangled and recursive co-existence of processes. 
An implication of the last point is that a ‘re-entry’ of system integration into 
social integration can occur. In other words, perceived patterns of systemic 
compatibilities can be employed by social agency, i.e. for forming coalitions or 
contesting existing co-operative arrangements. Actors can take such patterns 
for granted, and conceive them as ‘black boxes’.15 Such attempts to ‘objectify’ 
complex patterns relying on a multiplicity of dispersed actions can be seen, in 
the language of actor-network theory, as ‘punctualisations’ (Callon 1992:95); 
they are ‘quasi-objects’ (Latour 1993). In this sense, compatibilities can be 
employed by actors to pursue certain goals (‘agency’). Furthermore, in big 
organisations not only the external environment is ‘black-boxed’, but also 
their ‘internal environments’ in the sense that their successful operation relies 
on numerous routines and standardised procedures.16 
However, from the internalist perspective, system integration is always the 
result of certain co-operative–conflictive relationships since each actor concerned 
is, in principle, ‘free’ to act as she/he wants. Management might assume 
that higher wages or bonuses bring about higher efficiency because of the 
higher commitment of workers. Thus, they ‘black-box’ the behaviour of their 
employees into a simple correlation (‘efficiency wages’), whereas for workers 
themselves their real behaviour depends on a complex articulation of many 
different factors and on their decision on how to act. Or, as Mouzelis points 
out, hierarchies can be employed as ‘technologies’ in the ‘construction, 
reproduction and transformation’ of ‘macro spaces’ by macro actors (1995: 
146–7). Thus, system integration and social integration are continuously 
turned into each other, depending on the standpoint and the intention of 
different actors. 
Another consequence is that attempts at strategic guidance on one level of 
agency can appear as an evolutionary trajectory on other levels. In other words, 
what appears to be a structural constraint for one actor, appears as an 
opportunity for transformation to another actor (Jessop 1996:125). For 
instance, the strategic re-configuring of synchronic structures (higher wages) 
appear as (and are in fact) exogenous effects to these ‘black-box’ actors 
whether they are aware of them or not. In terms of Mouzelis’s sophisticated 
framework, the latter find themselves in a position of ‘paradigmatic duality’ 
and ‘syntagmatic dualism’ whereas the ‘re-configuring’ actors operate in a 
position of ‘paradigmatic dualism’ and ‘syntagmatic duality’ (Mouzelis 1995: 
120–1). Put more simply, what for some actors appears to be a matter of fate 
and appears as objective ‘evolution’, is strategically shaped by others. 
Yet, not even for the actors pursuing the strategic intervention can any 
object be fully under their control: reality ‘resists’. Thus, the success of a 
project will always also depend on evolutionary dynamics which have not been 
foreseen. Even if an actor had the social side ‘under control’ (consensus and 
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commitment), the ‘systemic’ side would be too complex to be completely 
mastered. However, actors can acquire some knowledge on some evolutionary 
dynamics and develop monitoring techniques. Thus, for actors the system– 
social integration distinction is never unambiguous since it is a matter of 
judgement what they should regard as ‘systemic’ and what as liable to 
transformation depending on what they intend to do. 
Concluding Remarks 
Mouzelis’s reading of the system–social integration distinction tends towards 
an objectivist understanding of systemic (in)compatibilities. I suggested that 
there is no ‘absolute’ externalist outside from which society can exclusively be 
perceived as a ‘system’, because this perspective can always be turned into an 
internalist ‘inside’, i.e. a contingent field of action potentially liable to transformation. 
The concept of ‘process’ was proposed as an alternative to the 
‘system’ perspective. If a process is an ordered sequence of events over time, 
any disturbance of that ‘order’ can be seen as a systemic incompatibility. Since 
such a ‘malfunction’ has to be observed and conceptualised from some point 
of observation, processes are linked to the specific ‘objectivities’ of certain 
social actors. Thus, incompatibilities are never objective but linked to specific 
sites of agency. In part, actors themselves regard their social worlds as a set of 
entangled processes and attempt to cope with occurring incompatibilities. 
However, this does not imply that processes (or social integration) are at the 
discretion of actors. Reality tends to resist, given that society consists of many 
entangled processes which are co-constituted with ‘their’ respective actors and 
constitute ‘real’ constraints for others. But since actors are reflexive and 
knowledgeable about the social processes going on around them, they can 
attempt to ‘black-box’ the actions pursued by other actors and consider them 
as ‘systemic’. For this purpose, institutional modification is an important 
resource at their disposal. Because institutions are decisive for the performance 
of processes, a change of these regularities can be employed for an 
adjustment of those processes, which means removing incompatibilities and 
malfunctions from a specific standpoint. This involves either conflicts and/or 
co-operation. Thus, system and social integration do not merely co-exist as 
two independent viewpoints but they are entangled and intertwined: on the 
one hand, compatibilities/incompatibilities are of crucial importance for actors 
in coping with processes, and, on the other, conflict/co-operation can result in 
significant effects on processes. Actors can engage in conflict/co-operation for 
the sake of establishing compatibilities, but compatibilities can be perceived as 
incompatibilities by others and lead to further conflict/co-operation. Finally, 
conflicts and co-operation on one level can appear as exogenous compatibilities/ 
incompatibilities on another level of society. This shows, that 
system and social integration must be perceived as interlinked and intertwined 
in a number of ways while the distinction is certainly to be maintained not 
least because it represents a crucial cognitive resource of actors themselves. 
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Notes 
1. The recent contribution ‘follows up’ an article published twenty-three years 
earlier which offers a more detailed discussion of the distinction in the context of 
the theoretical debates in the 1960s and 1970s (Mouzelis 1974). 
2. In his seminal article, Lockwood (1964) criticised both the overemphasis of 
‘normative functionalism’ on the harmonious integration of societies, and the 
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‘overreaction’ of ‘conflict theories’ which emphasised the coercive and forced 
nature of social order. In the view of Lockwood, both theoretical traditions 
tended to neglect the system integrative side of the coin. 
3. For instance, according to Lockwood (1992), ‘contradictions’ can lead to social 
change only through the mediating power of agency. 
4. A ‘re-entry’ occurs when a distinction enters one of the two sides of the 
distinction itself (cf. Luhmann 1994). In the current case, this works as follows: 
The first distinction is between structure and agency, from the perspective of an 
‘external’ observer (the social scientist?). But in a second moment, the same 
distinction can also be drawn by an actor, i.e. within ‘agency’, so to speak. Actors 
can face insurmountable barriers and structural constraints, but normally they 
also perceive themselves as ‘autonomous’ and ‘self-determined’. Thus, the 
structure–agency distinction has ‘re-entered’ itself through its ‘privileged’ pole 
(agency). 
5. An implication is the recursivity of knowledge about society: ‘objective’ social 
science accounts can result in social transformation. See Demirovic (1992:146f.) 
on the ‘self-reference’ of knowledge and, in particular, social theory and 
Psychopedis’s (1992) remarks on dialectics; on the political power of knowledge, 
see Richardson (1996). 
6. On the ‘sociology of failure’ cf. Malpas and Wickham (1995). 
7. Compared with Mouzelis’s (1974:397) notion of ‘social process’, this is a more 
restricted and more abstract concept. 
8. Even a seemingly ‘natural’ process such as global warming is highly socially 
determined, i.e. constituted by a number of norms, rules and conventions 
responsible for the use of fossile energy sources. An example of the attempt to 
reconfigure a set of sedimented institutions (producing effects for the global 
climate) with the objective of shaping the gigantic process of global warming, are 
the very controversial UN ‘climate summits’. 
9. Note that Luhmann’s notion of social structure – defined as a more or less stable 
set of generalised expectations – also produces a link between the present and the 
future (cf. Luhmann 1995). 
10. The argument that incompatibilities have to be perceived by actors does not 
necessarily imply that they cannot take the actors by surprise. Consider, for 
instance, that institutional-technical systems (e.g. stock exchange markets, or 
nuclear power generation) cannot be designed in anticipation of all possible 
events. It is therefore very likely that they contain some type of built-in structural 
incoherence, possibly leading to mismatches or ‘accidents’ over time. However, 
those latent incompatibilities do not become virulent until the unanticipated 
events happen. Such ‘normal accidents’ (Perrow 1984) have their root in the 
efforts of certain actors to ‘design’ a process over time and deviate negatively 
from the expected course of events. In this sense, those incompatibilities are 
linked to the perception of the concerned actors (I am grateful to one of the 
anonymous referees for raising this important point). 
11. On the ‘reduction of complexity’ cf. Luhmann (1995:25–7). 
12. This involves a slight modification of Lipietz’s (1985:111) usage of the notion. 
Lipietz uses the term ‘stroboscopic’ to express the fact that the preconditions for 
the reproduction of social practices are identical to their results. In other words, if 
a set of institutional regularities is to be reproduced it must mobilise the 
continual support of actors. Thus, the existence of these institutions must be 
recognised and acknowledged by the actors concerned. This is why the 
reproduction of such regularities is always threatened and precarious. See also 
the related concept of the ‘doubly tendential tendency’ developed by Jessop 
(1990). 
13. Institutional modifications can be seen as politics per se, for instance, from a 
discourse analysis perspective where politics is defined as the subversion and reconstitution 
of social structure. For a theoretical conceptualisation of the primacy 
of politics, see Laclau (1990), Bertramsen et al. (1991), Torfing (1991). 
14. The analysis of conventions, routines and rules of interaction, as presented by 
convention theory (l’économie des conventions), offers some fascinating insights 
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into the trade-offs and/or mutual enforcement of efficiency and equality. See, in 
particular, the seminal article by Favereau (1994) showing how different theories 
(among others, Rawls’s ‘theory of justice’) deal with this dichotomy between 
efficiency and equality (mirroring the system–social integration distinction). 
15. A ‘black box’ can be defined as a set of regularities over time (a process) actors 
rely upon without knowing its precise ‘internal’ functioning. 
16. Cf. for instance the contributions of the ‘new institutionalism’ in organisational 
studies (Powells and DiMaggio 1991). The emphasis on ‘myths’ as a sort of truth 
proliferated within big organisations (and, indeed, ‘societies of organisations’, 
Perrow) marks an interesting congruence with the type of arguments proposed 
here. 
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